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WHAT'S WORSE, NUCLEAR WASTE OR THE UNITED
STATES' FAILED POLICY FOR ITS DISPOSAL?
INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is a nuclear nation. Despite individuals and organizations opposed to nuclear energy, 1 the reality
is that nuclear power is an integral part of our nation and world. 2
the United States specifically, nuclear power plays a vital role.
Just less than 20% of the electricity produced in the United
States comes from nuclear power. 3 Sixty-one commercial nuclear
power plants
operate in thirty states. 4 Furthermore,
nuclear power is
most abundant clean energy source, accounting for roughly 60% of the non-fossil fuel electricity generated in
the United States. 5 Additionally, the United States Navy is built
around nuclear energy. As of 2009, approximately 45% of the Navy's ships were nuclear powered, with 103 reactors powermg
eleven aircraft carriers and seventy-one submarines. 6
Whether or not the United States continues to use nuclear
power into
future, the country will be left with the remnants

1. See generally Karl S. Coplan, The Externalities of Nuclear Power: First, Assume
We Have a Can Opener ... , 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 17 (2008) (arguing that the benefits

of nuclear power are not worth the long term impacts of nuclear energy production).
2. See Alex Funk & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the Impasse in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 114 (2013) (stating that
nuclear power accounts for 13.5% of the world's electricity).
3. Nuclear Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplain
ed/index.cfm?page=nuclear_home#tab2 (last updated Sept. 8, 2014).
4. How Many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where Are They
Located?, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq/cfm?id=207&t=3 (last updated Jan. 22, 2015); see also Nuclear Power in the
USA, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Count
ries-T-Z/USA-Nuclear--Power/ (last updated Feb. 2015).
5. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (last updated June 13, 2014)
(stating that 67% of electricity in the United States is generated by fossil fuels and 19% by
nuclear; therefore, nuclear energy accounts for 57% of the remaining 33% of energy not
generated by fossil fuels).
6. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1 (2009).
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of its past nuclear usage
generations to come. After a certain
period of
the uranium fuel inside a nuclear reactor is no
longer capable of fission. 7 When this point is reached, the reactor
must be refueled, which involves removing the old uranium8
spent nuclear fuel ("SNF")-and replacing it with new
SNF
highly radioactive and can be hazardous to humans for
tens of thousands of years. 9 There are currently about 72,000
metric tons of SNF being stored on site at commercial nuclear
power
across the country. 10 However, this figure does not
the 13,000 metric tons of SNF and other radioactive
waste generated as a byproduct of the defense industry and the
custody of the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") at
various locations around the country. 11
So, what is the government's plan for all of this highly hazardous nuclear waste? Well, currently there is no real plan. 12 As a result of overly restrictive legislation and political fighting, the
United States has been unable to devise a solution to the problem
of where to safely store the ever-increasing stockpile of nuclear
waste. 13 The status quo of leaving SNF sitting on-site at nuclear
power plants raises safety concerns and questions about the ability to use those locations for some other purpose in the future.
Critics have raised concerns about SNF stored at power plants
being susceptible to terrorism and natural disasters. 14 Additionalunder the current scheme, SNF remains in place even after its
7. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG/BR-0216, REV. 2, RADIOACTIVE
WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL 7 (2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/read
ing-rm/ doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br02 l 6/r2/br02 l 6r2. pdf.
8. Id.
9. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117.
10. U.S. State by State Used Fuel and Payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund, NUCLEAR
ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/On-Site-Storage-of
-Nuclear-Waste/US-State-by-State-Used-Fuel-and-Payments-to-the-Nu (last updated May
2014).
11. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-230, DOE NUCLEAR WASTE:
BETTER INFORMATION NEEDED ON WASTE STORAGE AT DOE SITES AS A RESULT OF YUCCA
MOUNTAIN SHUTDOWN 1-2, 29 (2011); Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_
waste/issue_summary (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
12. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 115 (using the term "Achilles Heel" to describe the waste disposal problem, which has plagued the nuclear industry for sixty years).
13. See id. at 115-16.
14. See Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving the Spent Nuclear Fuel Impasse, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (indicating that there is a growing concern for
safety over at-reactor SNF storage).
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I.

THE

SNF PROBLEM

The
that led to the current SNF situation is
political and legal complications. It is, however,
standing the current condition of the SNF
summarizing here.

Nuclear

many

Cycle

The
cycle is a term used to
industrial processes used to produce electricity from
nuclear reactor." 16 Broken down into three major
consists first of a "front end," the mining and
a nuto be used as nuclear fuel; second, the
the
''back
end,"
clear reactor to create electrical energy; and
stored
when the SNF is removed
the reactor
mate disposal. 17
During the second part of the nuclear fuel cycle, when the urais being used as fuel
an operating
neutrons collide with uranium atoms resulting
fission-the splitting of the
15. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
ENERGY 9, 35 (2012) (explaining that SNF left on-site at shutdown power plants prevents
the land from other economically beneficial uses).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id.

1268

UNNERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1265

18

uranium atoms. The splitting of a uranium atom creates fission
fragments, each about half the mass of the original atom, and a
number of additional neutrons. 19 These neutrons will go on to collide with other uranium atoms, continuing the chain reaction. 20
The splitting of uranium atoms into fission fragments creates kinetic energy, which is in turn converted to heat and then electricity. 21 The fission fragments created in the nuclear reaction are
highly radioactive, and they remain in the SNF after it is removed from the reactor. 22
When the nuclear fuel can no longer efficiently produce energy,
it is removed from the reactor. 23 At the point of initial removal
the reactor, the SNF has a high temperature and emits
large amounts of radiation; it is therefore considered a High24
Level Waste ("HLW"). Immediately after coming out of the reactor, SNF is kept in "wet storage" by submerging it in deep, water25
filled pools. The SNF is typically kept in these pools for around
five years in order to keep it cool and help dissipate the radiation
26
it emits. After the SNF has cooled down sufficiently in wet
storage, it can be safely moved to "dry storage." 27 Dry storage is
typically accomplished by placing the SNF inside casks comprised
of an inner steel container surrounded by an outer concrete and
28
steel container. The SNF inside the dry casks can still have relatively high temperatures, but is cooled through natural circula29
tion of

18. See How a Nuclear Reactor Mahes Electricity, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.
worId-nuclear .org/nuclear-basics/how-does-a -nuclear-reactor-make-electricity-/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http:
//www. world-nuclear .org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/Physics-of-Nuclear- Energy/
(last updated Sept. 2014).
19. Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.; BLUE RIBBON CoMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 11.
23. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 10.
24. See id. at 10-11; High-Level Waste, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http:
//www.nrc.gov/waste/high-level-waste.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (identifying SNF as
one form ofHLW).
25. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 11.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.

See id.

29.

Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 27.
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Early SNF Policy
Civilian nuclear power was first developed commercially in the
United States in the 1950s with the understanding that the resulting SNF would be reprocessed for our nation's nuclear weapons program. 30 Under this early policy, SNF was only to be stored
on site at nuclear power plants temporarily until it would be
transported to reprocessing facilities so that the unused uranium
31
and plutonium in the SNF could be separated and reused. However, even after the reprocessing of SNF, there is still a portion of
radioactive waste that requires disposal. 32 So, in 1957 the
Academy of Sciences ("NAS") determined that underground
burial would be the best solution for HLW disposal. 33 Furthermore, in the 1970s, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation
effectively ended the United States' policy of commercial SNF reprocessing. 34 In 1978, with reprocessing of SNF no longer considered an option, an Interagency Review Group recommended that
federal government become responsible for the disposal
35
commercial SNF and that it be disposed in a geologic repository.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
Subsequent to shifting from a policy that included SNF reprocessing to one that was solely focused on geologic burial, Congress
36
passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA''). The
established that the federal government would take custody of commercial SNF and required the DOE to recommend at
least
sites for a potential location for a geologic repository
its indefinite burial. 37 The NWPA also authorized the development of "monitored retrievable storage" facilities, which would act
as centralized locations for the interim storage of SNF while a re30. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117-18; Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14,
at 8-9.
31. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 118.
32. Id. at 140.
33. Debra J. Carfora, Building a Sustainable Energy Future: Offering a Solution to the
Nuclear Waste Disposal Problem Through Reprocessing and the Rebirth of Yucca Mountain, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGYL. 143, 153 (2012).
34. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9.
35. Carfora, supra note 33, at 153; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 119.
36. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2012).
37. Carfora, supra note 33, at 154.
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constructed. 38 Until a geologic repository or
was developed, electric utilities were
39
SNF on-site at nuclear power plants.
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38. 42 U.S.C. § 10161; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 10151; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(B); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121.
43. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(b); see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a); Carfora, supra note 33, at 155.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10165(b), 10168(d)(l); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120;
Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 67 (explaining that the restrictions that the 1987
amendments to the NWPA placed on consolidated interim storage facilities were based on
a concern that their establishment would undermine the development of a geologic repository).
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47. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 121-22. This includes the excavation of "a five mile tunnel through the
mountain to function as an Exploratory Study Facility." Id. at 122.
50. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/RW0508, VIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, OVERVIEW 2 (1998).
51. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 157; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 124.
52. See Joseph A Cohen, What to Do with America's Nuclear Defense Waste: The Hanford Effect, 6 KY. ,J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 8-9 (2014) (stating that the
1987 NWPA, dubbed the "Screw Nevada bill," has seen significant local resistance); Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9 (noting Nevada's resistance to the Yucca Mountain project).
53. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 123.
54. Carfora, supra note 33, at 157.
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55

was used. Therefore, four additional years of research were reby the Environmental Protection Agency to comply with
, ruing.
i·
56
t h e courts
2008, after twenty years and $12 billion to establish Yucca
Mountain as the repository location, the DOE submitted a licensing application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to
begin the three-year licensing process. 57 But, in 2009, with the
start of the Obama administration, came a shift in policy against
58
Yucca Mountain. First, President Obama requested that Congress discontinue funding the Yucca Mountain project in an at59
tempt to stop its progress. The next year, in 2010, the DOE filed
a motion to withdraw the Yucca Mountain licensing application
prejudice, meaning that the application could never be refiled. 60 Although the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
denied the DOE's petition to withdraw the Yucca Mountain application,61 the licensing proceeding was nonetheless suspended. 62
States and municipalities that are home to nuclear power plants
brought legal action before the NRC and D.C. Circuit to
63
force the NRC to continue with the licensing procedure. As a result, in August 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued mandamus requiring
the NRC to process the Yucca Mountain licensing application. 64
The NRC has since resumed licensing proceedings. 65

cent litigation re
of commercial nui

In November '.
Secretary [of Em
adequate fee ass
Congress a propc
tively stopped thE

The uncertaint
tory has also led
plants. After mu
nuclear power p:
process because 1
sibility of leaks o
considered the p1
be built_ 68 Howm
"Waste Confiden
This has led the
nuclear power p:
Confidence Rule,
the licensing anc
continued litigat
tion to the SNF i:

E. Recent Litigation
addition to political and legal issues surrounding the estaba geologic repository for SNF, there has also been re55. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267, 1273 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
56. Carfora, supra note 33, at 158.
57. Cohen, supra note 52, at 9.
58. See id. According to Cohen, the policy shift against Yucca Mountain was a political
decision by President Obama, influenced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (DN evada) and tied to a campaign promise Obama made in the 2008 presidential election.
Id. at 9-10.
59. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159.
60. Id.; In re U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 61516, 2010 WL 91054 79 at *5 (N.R.C. 2010).
61. In re U.S. Dep't of Energy, 71 N.R.C. at 629.
62. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 13.
63. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159.
64. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
65. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 14.
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In November 2013, the D.C. Circuit held that "[b]ecause
Secretary [of Energy] is apparently unable to conduct a legally
adequate fee assessment, the Secretary is ordered to
to
66
Congress a proposal to change the fee to zero." This has effec67
tively stopped the DOE from collecting money for the NWF.
The uncertainty surrounding the Yucca Mountain SNF repository has also led to problems with the licensing of nuclear power
plants. After multiple states filed suit regarding the licensing
nuclear power plants, the D.C. Circuit suspended the licensing
process because the NRC had not adequately addressed the possibility of leaks or fires occurring in SNF storage pools, nor
it
considered the possibility that a geologic repository might never
be built. 68 However, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new
69
"Waste Confidence Rule" which addressed the court's concerns.
This has led the NRC to resume issuing licenses for commercial
nuclear power plants. 70 However, despite the NRC's new Waste
Confidence Rule, recent petitions have been filed to again
71
the licensing and relicensing of nuclear power plants. With this
continued litigation, it appears that there will not be any resolution to the SNF problem soon.

mnding the estab~ has also been red 1251, 1267, 1273 (D.C.

Mountain was a political
Leader Harry Reid (D108 presidential election.

iry), 71 N.R.C. 609, 615-

66. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 736 F.3d 517, 521
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
67. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 4 n.3.
68. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681F.3d471, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
69. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51); see also Sonal Patel, NRC Issues Final Rule to Replace
Waste Confidence Decision, Ends Licensing Suspension, POWER (Aug. 26, 2014), http://
www.powermag.com/nrc-issues-final-rule-to-replace-waste-confidence-decision-ends-licens
ing-suspension/. This new waste confidence rule concludes that SNF can be safely stored
on-site at nuclear power plants indefinitely. Id.
70. Nancy Slater-Thompson, NRC Resumes License Renewals for Nuclear Power
Plants, PENNENERGY (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/20
14/10/nrc-resumes-license-renewals-for-nuclear-power-plants.html.
71. See Danielle Killey, Tribe Appeals NRC's Waste Storage Rule30, REPUBLICAN
EAGLE (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.republican-eagle.com/content/tribe-appealsnrcs-waste-storage-rule30; Activists File Petition to Stop Licensing of U.S. Nuclear Plants,
LONGVIEW NEWS-JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.news-journal.com/news/nation/ac
tivists-file-petition-to-stop-licensing-ofu-s-nuclear-plants/article_42987 d 7f-f0e4-54c6-8c07d3a90beba077 .html.
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72. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 116; see also Carfora, supra note 33, at 159 (describing how the Blue Ribbon Commission was part of the President's plan to terminate
the Yucca Mountain project).
73. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii; Cohen,
supra note 52, at 10-11.
74. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii-viii.
75. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DOE
STRATEGY], available at http://www.energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-anddisposal-used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste; Cohen, supra note 52, at 1112.
76. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 12.
77. See DOE STRATEGY, supra note 75.
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

79. Funk & Sovacoc
posal issue. Reprocess
waste.").
80. Carfora, supra 1
for SNF disposal indud
Unfortunately, launchir
of nuclear contaminate<
malfunction. Id. Simila
within polar ice sheets.
81. BLUE RIBBON (
Commission concludes
possible to develop safe,

VIEW

49:1265

2015]

NUCLEAR WASTE

1275

Despite

disposal.

pository locations.
amount of time required to establish a ~~· ....~ ... re100Entc>rv
more intermediate storage
temporary storage of our country's ,_,v,.uu.u::;;.1.

:upra note 33, at 159 (de[dent's plan to terminate

a note 15, at vii; Cohen,

1ote 15, at vii-viii.

'AND DISPOSAL OF USED

013) [hereinafter DOE
·ategy-management-andn, supra note 52, at 11-

79. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140 ("[R]eprocessing does not eliminate the disposal issue. Reprocessing still generates a significant volume of highly radioactive
waste.").
80. Carfora, supra note 33, at 163-64. Some of the locations that have been considered
for SNF disposal include outer space, ocean bottom, and within the polar ice. Id. at 163.
Unfortunately, launching SNF into space is considered too dangerous because of the risk
of nuclear contaminated debris being sprinkled across the globe in the event of a rocket
malfunction. Id. Similarly, international agreements ban the disposal of SNF at sea or
within polar ice sheets. Id. at 163-64.
81. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35 ("The
Commission concludes that there are several compelling reasons to move as quickly as
possible to develop safe, consolidated storage capacity on a regional or national basis.").
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1. Geologic Repository

As part of the solution to the SNF problem, the United States
should continue to move towards establishing geologic repositories for the eventual permanent disposal of SNF. This plan should
include, but not be completely dependent on, Yucca Mountain
a repository location.
SNF requires disposal because it contains a large concentration
of unstable isotopes that undergo radioactive decay and in doing
so emit high levels of radiation. 82 Exposure to the radiation from
SNF can be dangerous to humans because the radiation has the
ability to alter the molecular structure of tissue. 83 The
that
results from radiation exposure can lead to cancer, genetic defects, and death. 84 Because of the extremely long half-lives
some of the radioactive isotopes in SNF, it can remain hazardous
thousands of years. 85 Therefore, as the Blue Ribbon Commission stated in its report, "deep geological disposal is the most
promising and accepted method currently available for safely isolating [SNF] and high-level radioactive wastes from the
ment for very long periods of time." 86
The development of a repository at Yucca Mountain is
at an impasse. 87 Furthermore, the Obama administration
no
intention of going forward with the Yucca Mountain project. 88
However, completely abandoning Yucca Mountain would be a
mistake. 89
Yucca Mountain is a prime location to develop an SNF repository.90 As stated to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works:

82. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON A:M.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 12.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 29.
87. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
88. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 159, 162 (discussing how, under the Obama administration, the Department of Energy attempted to withdraw the licensing application for
Yucca Mountain, and the Blue Ribbon Commission made no recommendations for Yucca
Mountain).
89. Id. at 168 ("[P]olicymakers should move forward with Yucca Mountain.").
90. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 109th Cong., YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE
MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 23 (2006).
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More is known about Yucca Mountain than any other parcel of real
estate on the planet .... It has been confirmed in the laboratory, reviewed by independent experts, and validated against information
from analogous sites around the world .... There is certainlJ; no rea1
son in science not to move forward directly with this project.

This has been determined after investing more than three dec92
ades and billions of dollars into researching Yucca Mountain.
However, the Obama administration has decided to
the
brakes on Yucca Mountain, not because of any technical or safety
93
issues, but rather solely for policy reasons. But despite the administration's policy shift against Yucca Mountain, the amount
research, time, and money that has already been invested
developing the repository makes the abandonment of Yucca
Mountain the wrong decision. 94 Otherwise, the last three decades
of SNF policy will have "left the country with no waste disposal
solution in sight and taxpayers with a $10 billion bill for a tunnel
95
the middle of the desert that leads nowhere."
Deciding to keep Yucca Mountain as part of the United States'
SNF plan is easier said than done. The "not-in-my-backyard" politics that have all but terminated Yucca Mountain are not likely to
go away. 96 However, it is possible that a compromise could
made to prevent a complete loss of the investment that the United States taxpayers have made in Yucca Mountain. Even if it is
not used as a repository for SNF, Yucca Mountain could still potentially be developed as a repository for low-level radioactive
waste. 97 The United States should keep Yucca Mountain as part
of the solution to the SNF problem, even if it is not as a permanent SNF repository.

91. Id.
92. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-229, COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE:
EFFECTS OF A TERMINATION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY PROGRAM A..l\JD LESSONS
LEARNED 10 (2011) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE].
93. Id. at 11.
94. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 167-68.
95. Id. at 166 .
96. See id. at 150 (describing how "not-in-my-backyard" politics have prevented Yucca
Mountain from coming to fruition); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (recommending that the current Yucca Mountain project be set aside due to local political opposition).
97. Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: The Future of Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP. J. Ser. TECH. &
ENVTL. L. 231, 234, 241 (2010).
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99. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 143.
100. Id. at 144 ("The current stockpile of commercial and defense nuclear waste destined for Yucca Mountain already exceeds [the capacity of Yucca Mountain], and the
amount of waste continues to increase.").
101. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 48.
102. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 92, at 10.
103. The Government Accountability Office has estimated that even if the licensing
process for Yucca Mountain were to resume, it would still take until at least 2027 before it
would be open as a repository. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-797, SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL: ACCUMULATING QUANTITIES AT COivIMERCIAL REACTORS PRESENT
STORAGE AND OTHER CHALLENGES 23 (2012). It has also been estimated that a new repository could take up to forty years to develop. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145.
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104. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-141, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
MANAGEMENT: OUTREACH NEEDED TO HELP GAIN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FEDERAL
ACTIVITIES THAT ADDRESS LIABILITY 1 (2014) [hereinafter SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
MANAGEMENT].
105. Id. at 11.
106. This is probably a bad assumption considering the United States currently gets
about twenty percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Nuclear Explained, supra note
3.
107. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 14.
108. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35-36 (noting
that as of January 2012 ten plants-Big Rock Point (Michigan), Haddam Neck (Connecticut), Hamboldt Bay (California), LaCrosse (Wisconsin), Maine Yankee (Maine), Rancho
Seco (California), Trojan (Oregon), Yankee Rowe (Massachusetts), Zion 1 & 2 (Illinois),
and Fort St. Vrain (Colorado)-all contain stranded SNF. Additionally, Vermont Yankee
shut down in December 2014, creating the newest stranded SNF. See Zoe Schlanger, Ver-

mont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Just Shut Down; U.S. Still Has No System for Disposing of Nuclear Waste, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.newsweek.comJvermontyankee-nuclear-plant-just-shut-down-us-still-has-no-system-disposing-295775.
109. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35.
110. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57.
111. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35.
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for the singular purpose of holding SNF. 112 This can be particularly burdensome considering the fact that the site is no
generating any revenue from electricity production to offset those
costs. 113
The other challenge unique to stranded SNF is that it prevents
the site from being used for some other purpose. 114 The local community is forced to deal with the fact that the stranded SNF is
there and the land that it sits on cannot be
to some more productive use. 115 This can be especially aggravating for the community because they never consented to the SNF being stored indefinitely nor do they receive any benefits for hosting this
material. 116
All SNF, but stranded SNF in particular, would be much better
suited if it were moved from the several sites where it is currently
located to one or more consolidated interim storage facilities
while a geologic repository is being constructed. 117 Consolidated
interim storage of SNF also has the support of the
and the
118
Blue Ribbon Commission. There are major benefits of moving
the commercial SNF to a consolidated interim storage
terim storage facilities are considered safer
more cost effective than on-site storage and would allow the
to meet its obligation of taking custody of the commercial
sooner than it
would if it had to wait for a permanent geologic repository. 119
The federal government contends that the current system of
storing SNF on site at commercial nuclear power
is safe. 120
In fact, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new
adopting
112. See id. ("[T]he operation and maintenance costs for spent fuel storage at shutdown
sites range from $4.5 million to $8 million per year, compared to an incremental $1 million
per year or less when the reactor is still in operation.").
113. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57.
114. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35.
115. Id.
116. See id. (discussing the impact of spent fuel on communities in the area).
117. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (advocating the simultaneous development of ''both centralized interim storage and permanent geological disposal facilities");
see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59 ("[T]he considerations invoked by BRC
and the Hamal Report also justify development of consolidated storage facilities for SNF
that now resides at reactor sites.").
118. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35; DOE
STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 2.
119. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138.
120. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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findings from a generic environmental impact statement
("GEIS"). 121
GEIS evaluated the safety of storing SNF on site
at nuclear power plants over three separate timeframes: shortterm (sixty years beyond licensed life of the reactor), long-term
(100 years beyond the licensed life of the reactor), and indefinite
storage (assuming no geologic repository ever becomes available).122 The GEIS concluded that commercial SNF can be safely
123
stored at reactor sites indefinitely. However, despite the government's confidence that SNF can be safely stored on-site at
power
the Fukushima incident
2011 has led some to
124
question how safe that policy actually is. Multiple consolidated
interim storage facilities for SNF could help protect the United
125
States against a Fukushima-like disaster.
By having consolidated interim storage facilities that include wet storage, SNF
could be moved from pools at nuclear power plant sites
the
126
event of an emergency requiring those pools to be cleared.
Besides safety concerns, proponents of consolidated interim
storage for commercial SNF argue that those facilities can
"achieve significant scale economies in operating and maintaining
security, yielding very significant operating cost savings relative
to the costs of providing security for the numerous storage facili127
ties at nuclear power plants dispersed across the country." These cost savings will be most significant for the country's stranded
SNF, where the cost for storage ranges from $4.5 million to $8
million per year. 128 According to the Blue Ribbon Commission, the
121. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51).
122. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG-2157, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, at xxx fig.ES-1
(2014) [hereinafter GEIS], available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1419/ML14196A
105.pdf.
123. Patel, supra note 69. See generally GEIS, supra note 122, at xlvii-xlviii tbLES-3
(indicating that even with indefinite at-reactor storage of commercial SNF, environmental
impacts would be generally small for all of the study's resource areas).
124. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 136; see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note
14, at 29. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex was struck by an earthquake
and tsunami that caused significant damage. Id. at 24. The most serious problems at Fukushima involved the SNF located in cooling pools that experienced cooling system failures due to the loss of electrical power. Id. at 24-25. This dangerous condition can lead to
a release of radiation. Id.
125. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 37-38.
126. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 49.
127. Id. at 52.
128. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35.
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savings associated with moving the stranded SNF to a consolidated interim storage facility would be enough to pay for that faCl·i·t
l y. 129
Establishing one or more consolidated interim storage facilities
would also allow the federal government to begin meeting its
waste acceptance obligations sooner than it otherwise would if it
130
for a geologic repository. Pursuant to the NWPA, the
entered
Standard Contracts with
for the removal of SNF
their reactor sites starting in 1998. 131
return for the
government taking custody of the SNF, the
utilities have made annual contributions to the NWF, which
would finance the eventual disposal
the SNF. 132 The fee that
utilities pay was initially set at 1
(0.1 cents) per kilowatt133
of nuclear electricity produced. The NWF currently has an
unspent balance of $27 billion. 134
II

:

'1

However, due to the delays in establishing a geologic repository
at Yucca Mountain, the federal government has not yet taken
custody of any commercial SNF. 135 As of March 2014, over ninety
lawsuits have been filed against the DOE for this breach of contract.136
2012, the federal government had paid $2 billion in
damages as a result. of these lawsuits. 137 The DOE estimates that
its future liability will be $21.4 billion through 2071. 138
Congressional budget rules have resulted in the NWF money
139
becoming essentially inaccessible. As a result, the damages that
the federal government has been paying to the utilities for its
breach of contract do not come from the NWF; instead, they come
the federal Judgment Fund. 140 "Because payments from the

129. Id.
130. See id. at 36 ("Developing consolidated storage capacity would enable the U.S.
government to begin fulfilling its legal obligations ... with respect to the acceptance and
removal of SNF from commercial reactor sites.").
131. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part LC.
132. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part LC.
133. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 70.
134. Id. at 71.
135. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121.
136. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2.
137. Schlanger, supra µote 108.
138. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2.
139. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 72.
140. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 102.
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141. Id. at 20, 102.
142. See BLUE RIBBON CoMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 36--37.
143. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138.
144. Id.
145. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-731T, NUCLEAR WASTE: DISPOSAL
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM YUCCA MOUNTAIN 12 (2011).
146. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59-60.
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147
storage facility until a geological repository is licensed. Additionally, by law, Yucca Mountain is the only site that can be con148
sidered for a geologic repository.
Therefore, Congress must
amend or repeal the NWPA to clear the way for the implementation of a workable SNF plan that includes developing a non-Yucca
Mountain geologic repository and a consolidated interim storage
facility. 149
In changing the NWPA to restructure the United States' approach to managing SNF, policymakers should adopt a consentbased approach to finding locations for a new geologic repository
150
and one or more consolidated interim storage facilities. Yucca
Mountain has not worked as a geologic repository site because the
project has been driven solely by politicians in Washington, D.C.,
151
has not had the support of the local community. Given this
opposition, "[t]he federal government must accordingly abandon
'top-down' prescriptions embraced in NWPA and its 1987
amendments, and the dysfunctional approach to their implementation."152 It is a positive sign that the Blue Ribbon Commission
and the DOE both support a consent-based approach for deter153
mining future SNF storage and repository locations.
In using a consent-based approach to establish future SNF
storage and repository sites, the federal government should tie
economic incentives to localities that are willing to host a consoli154
dated interim storage facility or geologic repository. A vigorous
incentive package is also something that the Blue Ribbon Commission identified as necessary in finding suitable locations for
SNF disposal. 155 Specifically, the United States' SNF plan should

147. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, sec. 5021, §
148(d)(l), 101 Stat. 1330-227, 1330-236 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10168 (2012)).
148. Sec. 5011, §160, 101 Stat. 227, 228.
149. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 146-47.
150. See id. at 145.
151. See, e.g., id. at 123-24 (describing how Nevada submitted a formal Notice of Disapproval in response to President Bush's approval of the Yucca Mountain repository and
subsequently filed multiple lawsuits after Congress and the President overrode Nevada's
disapproval).
152. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 75.
153. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 47; DOE
STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1-2.
154. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145.
155. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 58-59.
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tie storage and repository sites to research, development, and im156
plementation of SNF reprocessing.

SNF Reprocessing
157

Nuclear power technology has only existed for sixty years. It
be extremely shortsighted to think that this technology will
not continue to grow through advances in science and innovation.
Therefore, the Unites States should not focus exclusively on a
million-year solution to the SNF problem-burial in a geologic
repository-when emerging technology, such as reprocessing, can
of the answer. In order to solve its SNF problem, the
United States should change its policy to include the reprocessing
instead of solely focusing on permanent disposal.
When a nuclear reactor reaches the point where it can no longer efficiently maintain its chain reaction to produce energy, it
158
must be either decommissioned or refueled. However, despite
fact that the SNF can no longer be used efficiently in the reactor, the SNF still contains a large quantity of uranium that can
159
be used for fission. Reprocessing is the process of removing the
unused uranium from the SNF so that it can be reused as nuclear
in the future. 160 Even though reprocessing technology presently exists, 161 the United States currently has no commercial
SNF reprocessing plants. 162 However, by implementing repro156. The Blue Ribbon Commission recommends that a potential host site be "co-located
[with] research and demonstration facilities" but does not go far enough to explicitly encourage establishing a commercial SNF reprocessing program. Id. at 59.
157. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 8-9.
158. Decommissioning is the process of removing a nuclear power plant from service.
See Backgrounder on Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/decommis
sioning.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2014). As an alternative to decommissioning, nuclear
power plants can be refueled by replacing the SNF with fresh fuel. See U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 7, at 7.
159. See Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/opera
tions-1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (stating that
95% of the SNF removed from commercial nuclear reactors is uranium that can be recycled).
160. Fuel Reprocessing (Recycling), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.
nrc.Gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fuel-reprocessing-recycling,html (last updated Feb.
18, 2015).
161. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169 (stating that France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, and China have all instituted SNF reprocessing programs).
162. See Szabo, supra note 97, at 236 (stating that the only U.S. commercial SNF re-
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processing plant operated in West Valley, New York, for six years starting in 1966).
163. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70.
164. Szabo, supra note 97, at 235.
165. Id. at 235-36.
166. Id. at 236; West Valley Demonstration Project Nuclear Timeline, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY W. VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, http://www.wv.doe.gov/Site_History.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
167. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20. President
Carter stated that "a serious risk is involved in the handling of nuclear fuels-the risk
that component parts of this power process will be turned to providing explosives or atomic weapons" and that the United States would "defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs." Nuclear
Power Policy: Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Decisions
Following a Review of U.S. Policy, 1 PUR PAPERS 581, 582 (Apr. 7, 1977).
168. Statement Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy, PUB.
PAPERS 903, 904 (Oct. 8, 1981).
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169. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON Alv!:.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20.
170. DOE STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1.
171. See id. at 8.
172. See id. at 7, 10.
173. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70.
174. Id. at 169.
175. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/operations·
1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
176. Id.
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180. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140.
181. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 170; see also Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors,
supra note 175 ("Thanks to recycling and vitrification, the volume of highly radioactive
waste is reduced fivefold.").
182. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 171-72.
183. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 141.
184. Id. (citing Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
llOth Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office)).
185. Szabo, supra note 97, at 247. "With the significant costs of building a reprocessing
plant, the cost of reprocessing spent fuel would need to be significantly less than the cost
of mining, fabricating and storing new nuclear fuel." Id. at 246-47.
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186. Id. at 247.
187. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 168-69 ("Removing the heated short-lived components of the SNF could reduce the amount of space needed in the repository by eliminating
the large gaps between casks."). See generally Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, llOth Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) ("Policymakers weighing the merits of reprocessing and
direct disposal may have other concerns besides cost-such as extending U.S. uranium
resources ... or lessening the demand for long-term storage space. Judging whether those
goals justify the added costs of reprocessing is ultimately a decision for policymakers.").
188. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND CONTAMINATED SITE CLEAN-UP,
PROCESSES, TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 148 (William E. Lee, et al.
eds., 2013) ("A de facto moratorium was placed on reprocessing of commercial spent nuclear fuel in the US in 1977; this ban was lifted in 1981 .... "); Carfora, supra note 33, at 172
(''Many critics oppose reprocessing on grounds that it could lead to nuclear weapons proliferation."); BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20 (stating
that the presidential directive deferring commercial reprocessing of SNF was in response
to concerns of nuclear weapons proliferation).
189. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, supra note 175.
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205

and development. By tying disposal and storage locations with
reprocessing, the United States could more easily implement a
multifaceted approach to solving the SNF problem.
The last three decades of failed SNF policy prove that a singular-focused, top-down approach will not work. 206 Instead boxing
the nuclear industry into an all-or-nothing plan, the United
States' SNF policy should take a flexible, iterative approach. 207
The Blue Ribbon Commission has identified the need for this
208
change, but in order to implement it there must be a significant
bipartisan political effort coupled with a focus on sound science.
The United States cannot afford to keep ignoring its nuclear
waste problem. Regardless of individual opinions about the wisdom of nuclear power, SNF is here to stay. 209 The United States
should move towards a solution by adopting a multidimensional
approach including reprocessing, consolidated interim storage,
and eventual permanent SNF disposal.
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205. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 47.
206. See id. at 78-79 ("NWPA imposed a blueprint for Yucca that defined the key elements of the repository project at the outset and prescribed a rigid timetable for implementation.").
207. See id. (discussing how the Waste Isolation Pilot Program in New Mexico was successful because it involved a flexible iterative process).
208. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 31 ("Flexibility ... is needed because implementing a disposal program will take at least several generations, during which technology and values are sure to evolve .... ").
209. See supra text accompanying note 9.
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Richmond School of Law. M.E.M., 2013, Old
Dominion University; B.S., 2007, United States Naval Academy. I must express my extreme gratitude to Casey, for years of listening to me talk about nuclear power. Thank
you also to the University of Richmond Law Review's editors and staff whose tireless and
thankless work has made this comment possible.
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